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CANYON COUNTY NOS. CR 2008-23501 
& CR 2011-20389 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ON REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This Court granted the State's Petition for Review of the Opinion of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals in State v. Olivas, Docket Numbers 39682 & 39683, 2013 Opinion No. 
48 (September 6, 2013) (hereinafter, Opinion). In a split decision, the Court of Appeals 
held that under I.C. § 18-8311(1), a district court may suspend the defendant's 
sentence. The Court of Appeals held that I.C. § 18-8311 does not expressly prescribe a 
mandatory minimum sentence and the only means by which the legislature can prohibit 
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a district court from suspending a sentence without violating Article V, Section 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution, is by expressly prescribing a mandatory minimum sentence. 
In its brief in support of its petition for review, the State adopts the reasoning of 
the dissent, and argues that Article V, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution allows the 
legislature to circumscribe a district court's ability to suspend a sentence, regardless of 
whether the statute at issue prescribes a specific mandatory minimum sentence. Or in 
other words, Article V, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution provides the Idaho 
legislature total control over the judiciary's "inherent" authority to suspend a sentence. 
Contrary to the State's position, Mr. Olivas argues that the district court did not 
violate I.C. § 18-8311 when it retained jurisdiction because the statute does not contain 
any language precluding the district court from either suspending a sentence or 
retaining jurisdiction after a defendant has been convicted for failing to register as a sex 
offender. Mr. Olivas also agrees with a majority of the Court of Appeals that Article V, 
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution only affords the legislature one mechanism by 
which it can encroach on the judiciary's inherent authority to suspend a sentence, and 
that mechanism is by prescribing a mandatory minimum sentence. Mr. Olivas also 
argues, in the alternative, that I.C. § 18-8311 is an ambiguous statute and that the 
State's interpretation of the statute runs afoul of the rule of lenity and becomes, under 
certain circumstances, would literally be impossible. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In docket number 39683 (hereinafter, First Case), Mr. Olivas was indicted on two 
counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years and one count of 
attempted sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years. (R., pp.19-21.) 
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Olivas pleaded guilty to one count of sexual abuse of 
a child under the age of sixteen years and, in return, the State agreed to dismiss the 
remaining charges. (R., pp.40-42.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.63-64.) 
Upon review of Mr. Olivas' period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district 
court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Olivas on probation for a period of seven 
years. (R., pp.71-73.) Mr. Olivas was also required to register as a sex offender 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-301, et seq. (R., pp.63-64, 68-73.) 
In docket number 39682 (hereinafter, Second Case), Mr. Olivas was charged 
with failure to register as a sex offender. (R., pp.156-157.) Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Mr. Olivas pleaded guilty to the charge of failure to register as a sex 
offender. (R., pp.160-162.) The State also filed a petition for probation violation in the 
First Case and Mr. Olivas admitted that he violated the terms of his probation. 
(R., pp.99-101.) At a consolidated sentencing/probation violation disposition hearing, 
the district court revoked probation in the First Case and, in the Second Case, imposed 
an indeterminate sentence of five years, to run consecutively to the sentence in the First 
Case. (R., pp.103-109, 163-165.) The district court also retained jurisdiction in both 
cases. (R., pp.103-109, 163-169.) 
The State then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion 
alleging that the district court imposed an illegal sentence. (R., pp.110-113, 170-173.) 
Specifically, the State argued that I.C. § 18-8311 did not allow the district court to retain 
jurisdiction because the statute requires probation to be revoked in the First Case, and 
the sentence in the Second Case to run consecutively to the sentence in the First Case. 
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(R., pp.110-113, 170-173.) Based on the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding in State v. 
Brown, 153 Idaho 781 (Ct. App. 2011), the district court concluded that it could not 
retain jurisdiction in the Second Case, but that it could retain jurisdiction in the First 
Case. (R., pp.125-129, 188-191.) Accordingly, the district court denied the State's 
motion as to the First Case and granted the Motion and reversed its order retaining 
jurisdiction in the Second Case. (R., pp.125-129, 188-191, 202-203.) 
Upon review of Mr. Olivas' rider in the First Case, the district court suspended his 
sentence and placed him on probation. (R., pp.119-122, 130-135, 179-181.) 
The State timely appealed. (R., pp.119-121, 179-181.) This appeal was initially 
assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal as it relates to the 
Second case because the State did not advance any arguments on appeal as to that 
case. 1 (Opinion, p.2.) The Court of Appeals then upheld the district court's 
determination that it could retain jurisdiction and suspend the sentence in the First 
Case. (Opinion, pp.2-5.) The State filed a petition for review, which was granted by this 
Court. 
1 The State did not challenge this dismissal in the respondent's brief in support of 
petition for review, so the only issue before this Court relates to the First Case. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court acted consistent with Idaho Code § 18-8311 when it retained 
jurisdiction and subsequently reinstated Mr. Olivas on probation in the underlying 
criminal case after Mr. Olivas failed to register as a sex offender while on probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Acted Consistent With Idaho Code § 18-8311 When It Retained 
Jurisdiction And Subsequently Reinstated Mr. Olivas On Probation In The Underlying 
Criminal Case After Mr. Olivas Failed To Register As A Sex Offender While On 
Probation 
A. Introduction 
The district court acted consistent with I.C. § 18-8311 when it retained jurisdiction 
because the statute does not contain any language precluding the district court from 
either suspending a sentence or retaining jurisdiction after a defendant has been 
convicted for failing to register as a sex offender. Accordingly, the district court correctly 
adhered to the plain meaning of the statute when it decided to retain jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals' Opinion is consistent with the Idaho 
Constitution and authority from this Court interpreting the Idaho Constitution. In Idaho, 
the power to suspend a sentence is an inherent power of the judiciary and the only way 
the legislature can preclude a court from suspending a sentence is by creating a 
sentence with a mandatory minimum. Since I.C. § 18-311 does not set forth a 
mandatory minimum sentence, the district court appropriately exercised its inherent 
authority when it retained jurisdiction and subsequently suspended Mr. Olivas' 
sentence. 
Mr. Olivas argues, in the alternative, that if I.C. § 18-311 is deemed ambiguous 
and, due to his status as a criminal defendant facing a loss of liberty, the rule of lenity 
applies and this Court should accept his reasonable interpretation of the statute. 
Specifically, Mr. Olivas argues that I.C. § 18-311 only required the district court to 
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revoke probation in the First case, and order his sentence in the Second Case to run 
consecutively to his sentence in the First Case. 
B. Standard 
The Idaho Supreme Court utilizes the following framework when interpreting a 
statute: 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free 
review. It must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed 
as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but 
simply follows the law as written. A statute is ambiguous where the language is 
capable of more than one reasonable construction. 
City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69 (2003). 
C. By The Plain, Usual , And Ordinary Meaning Of The Words Contained Therein, 
Idaho Code § 18-8311(1) Does Not Preclude A District Court From Retaining 
Jurisdiction After Imposing A Sentence Pursuant To The Statute 
Idaho Code § 18-8311 ( 1) reads as follows: 
An offender subject to registration who fails to register, verify his address, 
or provide any notice as required by this chapter shall be guilty of a felony 
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison system for a 
period not to exceed ten (10) years and by a fine not to exceed five 
thousand dollars ($5,000). If the offender is on probation or other 
supervised release or suspension from incarceration at the time of the 
violation, the probation or supervised release or suspension shall be 
revoked and the penalty for violating this chapter shall be served 
consecutively to the offender's original sentence 
I.C. § 18-8311(1) (emphasis added). This statute guides the district courts exercise of 
discretion in three ways 1) the court is to impose a to sentence no more ten years; 2) it 
requires the district court to revoke the offender's probation2; and 3) where a prior term 
2 At oral argument before the Court of Appeals, Judge Gutierrez suggested that the 
requirement that probation must be revoked in the older case runs afoul of Idaho's 
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of probation was revoked, it requires the district court to order the sentence for failure to 
register as a sex-offender to run consecutively to the sentence imposed upon 
revocation of the defendant's probation. Section 18-8311 (1) says nothing of the district 
court's ability to retain jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (4). 
Mr. Olivas' argues that the foregoing statute does not create a mandatory 
minimum sentence when it is compared with other statutes that create mandatory 
minimum sentences. In State v. Pena-Reyes, 131 Idaho 656 (1998), the defendant 
challenged the constitutionality of a statute which "imposes a mandatory minimum 
sentence of five years for a guilty plea to trafficking in cocaine, which 'shall not be 
suspended, deferred, or withheld."' Id. at 656. The statute in that case, I.C. § 37-
2732B(a)(B) reads as follows: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, with respect to any person 
who is found to have violated the provisions of this section, adjudication of 
guilt or the imposition or execution of sentence shall not be suspended, 
deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for parole prior to 
serving the mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment prescribed in 
this section. Further, the court shall not retain jurisdiction 
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(8) (emphasis added). This is an example of a statute which 
expressly precludes a district court from suspending a sentence. In contrast, I.C. § 18-
8311(1) neither delineates a mandatory minimum sentence wherein the district court is 
specifically precluded from suspending, deferring or withholding the execution of the 
sentence, nor explicitly states that a district court cannot retain jurisdiction. Thus, in 
separation of powers doctrine because it infringes on the judiciary's inherent authority to 
determine whether probation should be revoked, as it enables the legislature to require 
a court to reverse the court's prior determination that a defendant is suitable for 
probation. 
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enacting I.C. § 18-8311(1), the legislature did not announce an intention to circumscribe 
a district court's inherent authority to suspend a sentence or retain jurisdiction. 
Additionally, Idaho's persistent violator statute, I.C. § 19-2514, which contains 
language similar to I.C. § 18-8311 provides an example of a statute that does not 
preclude a district court from retaining jurisdiction. Idaho Code Section 19-2514 
contains the following language: 
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony, 
whether the previous convictions were had within the state of Idaho or 
were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent 
violator of law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a term in 
the custody of the state board of correction which term shall be for not less 
than five (5) years and said term may extend to life. 
In State v. Toyne, 151 Idaho 779 (Ct. App. 2011), the district court interpreted the 
foregoing language to require a mandatory minimum five year term of imprisonment. 
The district court also reasoned that even if the statute allowed it to retain jurisdiction it 
would not because I.C. § 19-2514 "did not allow the court to suspend the sentence at 
the end of the" rider and, thus, "such a disposition would be pointless." Id. at 781. The 
Court of Appeals disagreed and employed the following rationale in reversing the district 
court: 
When the legislature has intended to require that a prescribed 
minimum sentence be a fixed term, without opportunity for probation or 
other sentencing alternatives, it has demonstrated its ability to make that 
intent entirely clear. For example, Idaho Code § 37-27328 specifies that 
offenses of trafficking in certain controlled substances carry "mandatory 
minimum fixed term(s) of imprisonment," and "[n)otwithstanding any other 
provision of law, with respect to any person who is found to have violated 
the provisions of this section, adjudication of guilt or the imposition or 
execution of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor 
shall such person be eligible for parole prior to serving the mandatory 
minimum fixed term of imprisonment prescribed in this section. Further, 
the court shall not retain jurisdiction." I.C. § 37-27328(8). 
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When, however, the statute provides only that a particular crime is 
punishable by a term of custody or imprisonment of not less than a 
specified number of years, it has generally been held that the statute does 
not require that this term be fixed. 
Id. at 782-783 (original emphasis). The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that 
I.C. § 19-2514 did not preclude the district court from either retaining jurisdiction or 
suspended the sentence. Id. at 783. Since I.C. § 18-8311 is similar to I.C. § 19-2514 in 
that I.C. § 19-2514 uses the phrase "shall be punished by imprisonment," and I.C. § 18-
8311 states that "probation ... shall be revoked" and the new sentence "shall be served 
consecutively to the offender's original sentence .... " This is the very type of language 
which does not create a mandatory prison term. 
Furthermore, even if I.C. § 18-8311(1) could be interpreted as a legislative act 
eliminating a district court's inherent authority to suspend a sentence from the outset, its 
plain language does not eliminate a district court's authority to retain jurisdiction and 
later suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation. Where a defendant 
is convicted of violating I.C. § 18-8311(1), the defendant "shall be punished )2y 
imprisonment in the state prison system for a period not to exceed ten (10) years and by 
a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000)." I.C. § 18-8311(1) (emphasis 
added). A district court retaining jurisdiction under I.C. § 19-2601(4), in fact, orders the 
defendant to be imprisoned in the state prison system for up to 365 days - a period that 
does not exceed 10 years. I.C. § 19-2601 (4). The plain, usual, and ordinary meaning 
of I.C. § 18-8311 (1) allows the district court to retain jurisdiction. 
In sum, the Idaho Legislature uses very specific language when it writes a 
sentencing statute which curtails a district court's ability to either suspend a sentence or 
retain jurisdiction. Since I.C. § 18-8311 does not contain any language creating a 
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mandatory sentence or precluding a district court from either suspending a sentence or 
retaining jurisdiction, the district court in this matter did not err when it retained 
jurisdiction in the First Case. 
D. Article V, Section 13 Of The Idaho Constitution Only Allows The Idaho 
Legislature To Prescribe Mandatory Minimum Sentences, But Otherwise Does 
Not Encroach On The Judiciary's Inherent Power To Suspend A Sentence 
'The separation of powers doctrine embodies the concept that the three 
branches of government, legislative, executive and judicial, should remain separate and 
distinct so that each is able to operate independently." Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 
135, 139 (1990). The separation of powers doctrine is codified in Article II, Section 1 of 
the Idaho Constitution which follows: 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three 
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person 
or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly 
belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly 
directed or permitted. 
In Idaho the power to suspend a sentence is "an inherent right of the judicial 
department and one which the separation of powers concept in our system of 
government places above and beyond the rule of mandatory action imposed by 
legislative fiat." State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971). In McCoy, this Court struck 
down a statute for violating Idaho's separation of powers doctrine, contained in Article II 
Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution, because the statute prevented a court from 
suspending a sentence and placing a defendant on probation. After the McCoy 
Opinion was issued, the people of Idaho amended Article V Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution in order to allow the legislature to enact mandatory minimum sentences. 
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Mr. Olivas agrees with the majority of the Court of Appeals, which held that this 
amendment is limited in scope, and the only way the legislature can limit a district 
court's inherent power to suspend a sentence is by creating a mandatory minimum 
sentence. The current version of Article V, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution is as 
follows: 
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial 
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a 
coordinate department of the government; but the legislature shall provide 
a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the 
methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts 
below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without 
conflict with this Constitution, provided. however, that the legislature can 
provide mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any sentence 
imposed shall be not less than the mandatory minimum sentence so 
provided. Any mandatory minimum sentence so imposed shall not be 
reduced. 
(emphasis added). The underlined portion of Article V, Section 13, is the language 
added through the amendment. That language is limited and states that the legislature 
can create mandatory minimum sentences; it contains no other language which allows 
the legislature to encroach on the judiciary's inherent power to suspend a sentence. In 
other words, Idaho courts have a reservoir of power to suspend a sentence and the 
amendment to Article V, Section 13 only creates one circumstance where the legislature 
can control the question of whether a defendant's sentence must be served. Based on 
the foregoing authority, the Court of Appeals held in this case as follows: 
Article V, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution circumscribes the inherent 
power of Idaho courts to suspend sentences only when the legislature 
prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence in a constitutionally enacted 
statute; Idaho courts retain that inherent power in all other cases. 
Because I.C. § 18-8311 does not contain any language imposing a 
mandatory minimum sentence, the district court did not err by suspending 
Olivas's original sentence in Docket number 39683 and placing him on 
probation after a period of retained jurisdiction. 
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(Opinion, p.5.) When the legislature does not create a mandatory minimum sentence, 
Idaho courts retain the inherent power to suspend a sentence. From a policy 
perspective this makes sense. The amendment to Article V, Section 13 enables the 
legislature to identify certain offenses which are so egregious that probation is not an 
option. However, in all other circumstances, a court retains the ability to suspend a 
sentence because it is in a much better position to make the individualized 
determination of whether a specific defendant should be placed on probation. 
Since I.C. § 18-311 does not have the requisite language to create a mandatory 
minimum sentence, the Court of Appeals correctly held that I.C. § 18-8311 did not 
preclude the district court from exercising its inherent power to suspend Mr. Olivas' 
sentence. Therefore, the district court was operating within its inherent judicial authority 
when it retained jurisdiction and subsequently suspended Mr. Olivas' sentence. 
E. In the Event This Court Finds That I.C. § 18-8311 Is Ambiguous It Should Be 
Interpreted In a Manner Favorable To Mr. Olivas 
When interpreting a statute, courts are to adhere to the literal language of the 
statute unless there is an ambiguity. City of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69. In order to be 
deemed ambiguous, a statute must be deemed to have more than one reasonable 
construction. Id. "The principle of lenity mandates that criminal statutes be read 
narrowly and, where ambiguity exists, in a manner that provides leniency toward 
defendants." State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 566 (Ct. App. 1999). This principle of 
lenity "dictates" a reading of statutes "that allows a court to suspend a sentence 
imposed, not an interpretation that finds a mandatory" sentence. Id. 
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"If the statute is ambiguous, then it must be construed to mean what the 
legislature intended for it to mean." City of Sandpoint, 139 Idaho at 69. "Where there 
has been no legislative action declaring a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, 
thusly canceling a court's power to suspend sentences, such power to suspend should 
be preserved." Harrington, 133 Idaho at 666 n.5. 
While Mr. Olivas argues above that I.C. § 18-8311 is not ambiguous and that it 
only requires the sentence imposed in the failure to register case to be ordered to run 
consecutively to a prior case. However, if this Court were to agree with the State's 
interpretation, Mr. Olivas argues, at a minimum, the statute is ambiguous and this Court 
should adopt Mr. Olivas' interpretation of the statute. The statute at issue, Idaho Code 
§ 18-8311(1), reads as follows: 
An offender subject to registration who fails to register, verify his address, 
or provide any notice as required by this chapter shall be guilty of a felony 
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison system for a 
period not to exceed ten (10) years and by a fine not to exceed five 
thousand dollars ($5,000). If the offender is on probation or other 
supervised release or suspension from incarceration at the time of the 
violation, the probation or supervised release or suspension shall be 
revoked and the penalty for violating this chapter shall be served 
consecutively to the offender's original sentence. 
I.C. § 18-8311(1) (emphasis added). The State focuses on the word "served" and 
argues that it literally means that the sentence must be executed. According to the 
State, "[a]t a minimum, this statute clearly mandates the revocation of probation and the 
service of consecutive sentences of incarceration. Sentences cannot be served 
consecutively unless each is actually served." (Respondent's Brief in Support of 
Petition for Review, p.9.) On the other hand, Mr. Olivas argues in the absence of 
language to the contrary, "served" means that the district court is required to order the 
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new sentence to run consecutive to old sentence. Had the legislature intended served 
to mean executed it would have added other language indicating such an intention. 
Additionally, if the State's interpretation of I.C. § 18-8311 is upheld, then it would 
require, under certain circumstances, for the court to increase the sentence which was 
initially imposed in the case in which the defendant was on probation. For example, if a 
defendant only has indeterminate time remaining in the older probation case, and is 
then given a sentence containing fixed time in the newer failure to register case, then in 
order for the sentence in the older probation case to literally be executed and physically 
spent in prison before the sentence in the newer failure to register case, the 
indeterminate sentence in the older probation case would have to be served as fixed 
time. This would have the affect of illegally increasing the sentence in the probation 
case. See State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 585 (1980) (holding that a district court 
cannot to increase a previously imposed sentence). 
interpretation of I.C. § 18-8311 is untenable. 
Therefore, the State's 
As a final note, and as mentioned above, the rule of lenity requires that this Court 
adhere to a reasonable interpretation favorable to Mr. Olivas. Moreover, since 
Mr. Olivas is advocating for an interpretation of the statute which preserves the 
judiciary's ability to suspend a sentence, the rule of lenity also suggests a holding in 
Mr. Olivas' favor. Harrington, 133 Idaho at 666 n.5. This makes policy sense, because 
a court is in a much better position than the Idaho legislature to make the determination 
of whether an individual defendant should be placed on probation. 
In the event this Court does find an ambiguity in I.C. § 18-8311, Mr. Olivas 
contends that the legislature most likely intended the statute to require the district court 
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to impose a sentence consecutive to the sentence for the underlying sex offense. Any 
other interpretation runs afoul of the rule of lenity and increases the likelihood that the 
district court will be in the untenable situation where the statute mandates that it 
increase the length of a previously imposed sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Olivas respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Upon State's Motion for Correction of Illegal 
Sentence. 
DATED this 28th day of January, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WIL RSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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